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A B S T R A C T
Since the eruption of the Greek crisis in 2010 it has been almost impossible for the Greek state authorities to
initiate any infrastructural project without significant local and wider resistance. In this paper we seek to answer
how infrastructures became novel arenas of political conflict in Greece. We suggest that crucial for under-
standing this process is the dynamic relationship between infrastructures and popular political imaginaries.
During the recent ‘golden’ period of infrastructural development in the country (mid-1990s to mid-2000s) there
was a mutually constitutive relationship between popular imaginations of progress and the materiality of in-
frastructures, which attempted to underplay the disjunctive modernization processes within which that devel-
opment took place. Later though, this parallel relationship between the two was contested as the infrastructural
imaginary, which was transformed by the everyday discourses and practices created around infrastructure
projects, blurred the expectations and imagination ascribed to the ‘glorious’ period of national success and
modernization. In combination with the infrastructural gap of the crisis, the narrative dimension started taking
over the materiality of infrastructures allowing it to take on a life of its own. Understanding the mechanisms of
this relationship between imaginary and infrastructural materiality is key to comprehending the Greek economic
crisis without a crisis essentialism that attributes every process into the crisis per se.
Introduction
One of the major uprisings of the early post-dictatorial period in
Greece (1974–1981) took place in response to plans to construct a new
infrastructure. The people of Spata, a town in theMessogeia area outside
Athens, fiercely resisted government plans to build the capital city's
new airport within the boundary of their municipality. Following many
months of protests in 1975 and 1976, the locals erected a ‘watchtower’
overlooking the site where the airport was to be built and took shifts in
order to prevent works from starting and to alert those in the town of
any suspicious activity. On 13 February 1976, however, the govern-
ment decided to clear out the protesters. A large force of riot police was
sent from Athens to take control of the territory. This resulted in a series
of violent confrontations that lasted for many hours; 27 police officers
and 10 Spata residents were injured. The protesters overturned police
buses and took a policeman hostage for several hours in retaliation for
the arrest of five of their fellow villagers.
According to local oral histories that we recorded in 2014, the
majority of Spata's population in the 1970s relied on farming as a major
source of household income and they were not interested in losing their
land for an airport that none of them would use. At that time, air travel
was still exclusive and well outside the socio-cultural matrix of most
Greeks. Thus, although the government officials had promised com-
pensation, or had at least made abstract promises to farmers about
establishing new export markets, the Spata residents remained un-
convinced. Nevertheless, today, Athens International Airport
‘Eleftherios Venizelos’ is located precisely in Spata. Just 20 years after
the riots, work eventually began on it and it was completed in 2001–
with no significant resistance. This event is a testament to the seismic
shift in the collective perceptions, not only of the local community, but
also of the majority of the country's population, regarding infra-
structural development over those two decades.
However, this collective enthusiasm for new infrastructures within
the majority of Greek society– which as we will show below reached its
height from the mid-1990s to the mid-two thousand – was short-lived.
Since the outbreak of the crisis, the acquiescence for large scale infra-
structure projects took on a new form of suspicion and resistance.
Messogeia, located at the periphery of the metropolis, again became one
of the first places to demonstrate this new shift when, in late 2010,
Keratea, a town neighbouring Spata, rose up against the government's
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plans to build a new waste management facility for Athens and its
periphery there. What makes Keratea important analytically, though, is
not only its similarities to Spata's anti-airport struggle, which took place
thirty years earlier, but also the fact that Keratea was the first major
grassroots struggle that the Greek austerity governments faced fol-
lowing the signing of the initial loan agreement in May 2010. As such it
was also to prove indicative of the social movements that were to come
during the crisis. Keratea was paradigmatic not only in terms of qua-
litative characteristics, which one observes being repeated during the
protests of the crisis, but mostly because it indicated the concretization
of a new period in the history of Greek politics where infrastructures re-
emerge as one of the major public arenas of political and social con-
testation.
In the current paper, first of all we describe the process of transition
from the stage of consent of the 1990s to that of contestation in 2010s.
We explain that at the forefront of this transition is Greece's disjunctive
modernization, a notion we employ to refer to contradictory, fissured
and disparate processes that have shaped infrastructural development
in the country. Disjunctive modernization, we claim, is associated with
Greece's transition towards specific political, economic and technolo-
gical goals within the framework of EU policies, and it is best reflected
in the selective implementation and political translation of a set of
technologies of governance, westernization, and neoliberalism in the
Greek context.
We explore this by paying attention to the relationship between
popular imaginaries and infrastructure, which we suggest is a key factor
in understanding this rapid transition. We approach imagination as the
‘underdetermined effect of the technologies that engender it” (Sneath,
Holbraad, & Pedersen, 2009, p. 26). Looking at the relationship be-
tween infrastructure and imagination through its effects allows us to
consider their circumstantial, contextual, and creative codifications.
This approach echoes an already observed relationship as imagination
and infrastructures are so closely linked that Masquelier (2002) used
the term ‘mythography’ in order to talk about the ways in which local
communities in Africa imagined the new roads. Even at the heart of
North-Western Europe, the strong relationship between engineering
and imagination has led to the employment of the concept, of ‘imagi-
neering’ (Löfgren, 2004). South Eastern Europe is no exception to that
rule as highways, such as those along the Albanian-Greek borders, fa-
cilitate the international flows, but also the local and the official state-
run imaginary (Dalakoglou, 2009, 2010). As Jasanoff (2015, p. 22)
suggests technological projects can be associated both with ‘past cul-
tural achievements’ and with futures that seem promising or should be
avoided. In this sense, Nielsen and Pedersen's (2015: 239) discussion on
infrastructural imaginaries is instructive since they put forward a fra-
mework to engage with imagination ‘not merely as an individual's
subjective capacity for making sense of the world’, but also as ‘a crea-
tive force that is internal to matter itself’.
Synthesizing the micro and macro constitutions of infrastructural
‘reality’ we look into the diverse ways in which infrastructure is en-
acted; how, in other words, infrastructure – and its infrastructural
qualities – is not only constituted and made sense through its material
and technological codification, but also through its association with
wider symbolic and discursive registers. To do this we use the concept
of imaginary, rather than imagination, since the former connotes a
contextual and social approach (Bottici, 2014, p. 39). We understand
infrastructural imaginaries to refer to the interweaving of diverse nar-
ratives, imaginations and technologies mobilized around and in relation
to infrastructure to co-shape wider socio-political dynamics. As we
show, such imaginaries can extend well beyond the infrastructural
materiality, thus reconfiguring socio-political and infrastructural ar-
rangements. Hence, what is changing over these historical stages of
infrastructural development is the ways that collective imaginaries are
shaped – which in combination with the emerging infrastructural gap
(Dalakoglou, 2017a) are determining political futures locally and na-
tionally. Thus, given that the social imaginary refers to the ways that
‘people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others’
(Taylor, 2004, p. 23), infrastructural imaginaries eventually entail the
question of ‘how we ought to live together in society’ (Taylor, 2004, p.
3).
Consenting infrastructures
If today the Greek authorities struggle to implement their decisions
regarding infrastructures, things were not always like this. There was a
period when announcements about infrastructures were met with
consent or even the enthusiasm of the ‘critical mass’. During the so-
called ‘golden decade’ of public works (Tarpagos, 2010) – between the
mid-1990s and mid-2000s – even the majority of Spata's inhabitants
welcomed the new airport, which was part of a large urban and infra-
structural (re)development project that took place during that period.
The role of that project was so crucial, ideologically and in terms of
political economy, that the Greek construction sector was labelled the
‘steam engine’ of the period's growth (Tarpagos, 2010) as Greece had
one of the European Union's highest rates of economic growth between
mid-1990s and mid-2000s (Kaplanis, 2011; Matsaganis & Leventi,
2011, p. 5).
The pinnacle of that development was the 2004 Olympic Games.
From 1997 on, when it was announced that Athens would host the
Games, they became the self-explanatory justification for almost every
policy, including the extensive destruction of the Athens cityscape and
its (re)development (Dalakoglou, 2013; Tarpagos, 2010). Athens and
Attica were transformed into large construction sites during that decade
(Totsikas, 2004). The list is long: new airport, Attica Ring-road, a
metro, a tram, suburban railway etc. Apart from the construction of
new infrastructures, the Ministry for the Environment, Physical Plan-
ning and Public Works announced that it will conduct more than 120
different public site regenerations in more than 60 different sites in
Attica during the period between 2002 and 2004 (To Vima, 2002).
Those very few voices that raised concerns were ignored. This included
some Leftist resistance like the ‘anti-Olympics’ movement (Portaliou,
2006) or marginalized groups such as the drug users of Omonoia Square
who reacted to construction workers and police when the latter tried to
renovate the square in the 1990s. In addition, more organized groups
like the Anarchists systematically resisted the construction works par-
ticularly the Olympics related surveillance systems.1 Aside from these
few exceptions, Athenians simply learned to walk, drive or ride mass
transport around construction sites, finding new pathways which were
perpetually rearranged as the constructions progressed. Such projects,
though, did not only target Athens' city centre but extended well be-
yond it. For example, a large part of Messogeia, the place where the
new Airport and ‘Attica Ringroad’ were built, was included within the
city's urban plan (To Vima, 2002). This had as a result the exponential
increase of land value (Gefou-Madianou, 2014: 19) and certainly led
the people of Messogeia area who previously were not considered
Athenians to start embodying, together with the Athenians, everyday
practices of slaloming construction sites. Moreover, the expansion of
the city and the new transport infrastructures also meant the creation of
new suburbs, which in combination with the EU integration and lower
taxes in cars led to the automobilization of Athens. It is perhaps enough
to mention that in 1989, Greece, with a population of almost 10 million,
had approximately 1,5 million private vehicles; by 2008 there were
more than 5 million private vehicles (Dalakoglou, 2013) registered.
Despite the hassle of the myriad of public works, The Games' sym-
bolic value was promoted on a massive scale and they were elevated to
a ‘national goal.’ The successful bid for the games was more or less
considered ‘the fulfilment of a national destiny, another Great Idea
1 It is worthy to note that the majority of the CCTV's put by Greek Police on
streets and public areas in the name of the Olympics' security were destroyed
before the Games by Anarchists with little sympathy for the Games.
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(Megali Idea) aiming to give back to Greece its “rightful place” among
the leading nations of the world’ (Karamichas, 2005, p. 134).2 Some of
the official slogans of the Games were telling of these efforts to create a
collective common identification of the entire nation with the Olym-
pics, like ‘The Whole Greece is Olympics’, which was also the title of the
official television show of the Organisational Committee of the Athens
Games run between 2002 and 2004.
Certainly, this rhetoric would not have been embedded properly
into the Greek national narrative if there were not effective references
to a historical continuity from antiquity (Herzfeld, 1987). The Olympic
Games, as an institution, has its own paradoxical connection between
the ancient Greek world and the world of multinational corporate
sponsors of 20th century, so the two became ideal partners for such
rhetoric. ‘Welcome Home’ (Yalouri, 2010, p. 2162), which was another
central slogan of the games, was also very indicative of this particular
connection between the past and the present. It explicitly claimed a
national collective ownership of the Games, and simultaneously also
implied a collective responsibility of the host. However, as Stavrides
(2014, p. 83) explains, in order for this imaginary collective self to be
created, a reconciliation had to be made between the two opposing
poles around which ‘Modern Greek national identity oscillates: “un-
iqueness”, based on a selective appropriation of history as opposed to
“inclusion” into a European modern cosmopolitanism’ (Stavrides, 2014,
p. 83). Certainly, this whole phenomenon found its materialization not
only in the Olympic Games, and their spectacle related activities within
the city (Stavrides, 2014), but also within infrastructural projects of
that most recent golden era of contractors such as the Athens metro that
aimed to merge glorious ancient past with a bright present and a
technologically advanced future (Kaika, 2006, pp. 296–297).
Thus, during that period, the various governments, the big Greek
corporations, and especially the corporate media (the owners of which
also had – in many cases – significant interests in the construction
sector) promoted a hegemonic rhetoric about the Olympics as the great
leap forward of progress and the future. A simple look at the shared
slogan (‘we move forward’) of the two largest companies involved in
the Games, Cosmote Telecommunication company and the Greek na-
tional lottery organization (OPAP), is explicit. This discourse was very
similar to the election campaign slogan of PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist
Movement), the party which won the crucial national elections of 2000:
‘We are making the new Greece – The Future Started’. This was the
party that governed the country between 1996 and 2004 carrying out
the majority of the country's infrastructural modernization. Perhaps
unsurprisingly that was the period that PASOK was controlled by the
fraction of the so-called ‘Modernizers’ (Ecsychronistes/Εξυγχρονιστές).3
This was the nickname of the Greek version of third way social-demo-
crats who had as their stated aims to modernize both the Greek polity
and society (and indeed infrastructures). Within that framework, it is
not an exaggeration to say that modernization became the new major
political ideology among the Greek political elites at the time, replacing
older divisions e.g. between Right and Left. The empirical research of
the Greek political elites of 1993 and 2000 prove this explicit trans-
formation (Pantazopoulos, 2002). Probably the most recognizable po-
litician of the golden period of infrastructural development was the
Minister of Public Works between 1993 and 2001, Costas Laliotis, who
apart from being a key person within PASOK's internal politics, oversaw
most of these newly built infrastructures. Arguably, the image of him
giving a speech to journalists and metro construction workers in front of
the ‘metro-mole’ (metropontikas/μετροπόντικας) – the nickname given
to the huge drill used for the tunnels of Athens metro – is one of the best
visual encapsulations of the period (Fig. 1.)
The release of news and images concerning the progression of public
infrastructure works was high in the political agenda of the
Modernizers. To this end, digital animations and physical architectural
models depicting how these projects will look when completed were
frequently broadcasted on national TV. Hence, they aimed at bringing
(visions of) the future closer to the present. Everyone could then par-
ticipate in a collective advance view of how the (modern) future would
look, triggering public imagination. The use of architectural models was
so widespread that the government of the Modernizers was accused by
the leading opposition New Democracy party that they governed via
architectural models. The PM of the Modernizers, Costas Simitis, was so
annoyed by these accusations that in 2004, and during a public speech,
he shouted in anger: ‘For years they were telling us about architectural
models, all the public works are models, is this public work here a
model?’.
This golden period of public works also saw the creation of its own
new type of elites, the mega-construction contractors (mega-
loergolavoi/μεγαλοεργολάβοι), who also serve in the collective ima-
ginary of contemporary Greece as representatives of that whole era. The
activities of such mega-contractors, like Giorgos Bobolas, have been
extended in many of the public works of the golden period (e.g. Athens
Airport and Attica Ringroad) as well as arguably in some of the most
successful mass media corporations. The built environment though was
not renewed only in terms of public spaces but also in terms of private
ones. The main protagonist of this renewal is probably Babis Vovos
(Fig. 2). In fact, the highway that connects Athens' centre with the
North suburbs and Attiki Odos was notoriously given the name of
‘Vovopolis’ (Βωβούπολη) after the series of construction projects he
carried out there (Chorianopoulos et al., 2013). Another famous big
contractor of public works of the same period was Socrates Kokalis who
was involved in the renewal of telecommunications infrastructures and
was famous for his company's collaboration with the state-run Greek
Telecommunication Organization, and was the owner of the big football
club Olympiacos.
All this material and urban newness and modernization was topped
up by a similar process that reached beyond the national borders rea-
lizing a new form of Balkan expansion close to the original ‘Megali Idea’
but in terms of neoliberal take over. Several companies (partly or en-
tirely) based in Greece took advantage of the postsocialist collapse and
expanded into the Balkans, buying and building infrastructures there,
such as the takeover of telecommunication companies in the Balkans
from the Greek Organization of Telecommunications (OTE)
(Dalakoglou, 2017b, 2010) and the renewal of networks carried out by
Kokalis' companies, as well as the purchase by Greek companies of
extraction facilities in the Balkans etc. This Greek corporate ex-
pansionism was well embedded within the inflation of national pride of
the period that played simultaneously into many fronts: from a thriving
economy to the integration in the Euro-zone, the renewal and un-
disputed modernization of the built environment, and the hosting of
mega-events. To top it off Greece also became an important power in
sports during that period. This included golden medals and world re-
cords in various sports and the European Championship in football in
2004. National anthems, spectacular parades of glory for athletes from
the airport to the city centre, and similar events became part of the
daily life in Greece.
In terms of political economy, the growth of the construction sector
during the 1990s was facilitated by two main elements: influx of re-
sources and legal adjustments. The first refers to two main processes:
the flow of cheap labour to the country coming from Balkan migrants,
and in terms of liquidity it refers to the Community Support
Frameworks of the European Community (especially the 1994–1999
and the 2000–2006 ones). Among their aim was European integration,
namely to assimilate less affluent countries within a supposed modern
2 Gefou-Madianou (1999: 432) notes that “The vision of the Great Idea and
the belief in their ancient past made the Greek people believe that they were in
a superior position in comparison to the rest of the Balkan peoples”.
3 The Modernisers took over the party's mechanisms after the internal elec-
tions of 1996 that the PM between 1996 and 2004, Costas Simitis, won.
PASOK's election slogan in 1990 was: ‘Reform, Co-operation, modernization,
development, stability’.
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European model including infrastructures. This came together with the
influx of the matching national funds. In this context, the legislation
regarding public works changed aim, partly, to a faster and more ef-
fective absorption of these packages. For example, during this golden
era, the state changed the regulations governing the tendering of public
works, allowing the concentration of activity to a few large firms
through the implementation of privatization models such as self-funded
or co-funded (public and private) works (Tarpagos, 2010). Similar legal
adjustments were also prevalent within the major infrastructure pro-
jects associated with the 2004 Olympic Games. During that period new
legal instruments were created that enabled a ‘fast track’ process of
privatization imbued with a sense of urgency (Skayannis & Kaparos,
2013, p. 45) as the entire modernization of the society and the economy
and the consequent national identification with modernity was at stake.
As perhaps was to be expected, under this framework where an
entire system was adjusting to serve the Olympic Games and modernize
and transform the infrastructures of the country, the majority of its
population identified with this historical project (Sevastakis, 2006).
Thus, the majority of Greeks were persuaded of the significance and
positive nature of the Olympic Games including all the new infra-
structures that would come along with them (Georgiakis & Nauright,
2012).4 Indicative of this was that Athens Olympic Games received over
100,000 applications from Greeks to work gratis as volunteers during
the Games. This is one of the highest records of volunteers in the history
of the Games, and it becomes even more significant when considering
the country's population.5 Indeed, among the volunteers the rhetoric of
the collective achievement and identification with the Games were
dominant. The great majority of the people who were interested in
volunteering for the Olympic Games 46,6% stated as their main reason
for volunteering the success of the Games and another 26.6% stated as
main reason their wish to participate in the excitement of the games
(Panagiotopoulou, 2003).
Scandalizing infrastructures
This ‘positive’ dynamic around infrastructural projects was followed
by a period where infrastructures were invested with symbolic refer-
ences of mistrust and controversy. Soon after the end of the Olympic
Games, a series of major political scandals, which involved infra-
structures, shook Greek politics, starting the deconstruction of the
imaginary of modernization with its new and shiny infrastructures.
First of all was the Vodafone Scandal. According to the NSA files
leaked by Edward Snowden, the Athens Olympic Games were a big
concern for the NSA as they were the first Olympic Games after 9/11.
Thus by 2002, US intelligence with the collaboration of Greek autho-
rities had already begun wiretapping communications (ostensibly) for
the security of the Games. Although, the government of the
‘Modernizers’ was in support of ‘legal’ wiretapping in the name of
Olympic Security, the period before the Games was pre-electoral and
they did not dare to pass such a decree, however, according to the
leaked US archives this does not mean that unlawful interceptions did
not occur (Kathimerini, 2015). This was not limited to suspects. A
whole mechanism centered around the US-embassy in Athens used the
Vodafone network to tap the phone lines of several members of the
Greek government, including that of the PM (Eleftherotypia, 2011).
Everything unravelled only a few months after the end of the Olympic
Games, in March of 2005, when Vodafone allegedly discovered wir-
etapping software attached to the main operational software of their
network. One day prior to this being revealed, Costas Tsalikides, one of
Vodafone's Senior Network Engineers who was responsible for the up-
grade of the network and its transfer to 3G in early 2000s was found
dead in his flat. At the time the Greek police recorded the incident as
suicide despite his family's insistence of foul play and pleas to in-
vestigate further (see To Pontiki, 2017a), however, in June 2018, the
Court of Appeals Prosecutor pressed homicide charges against ‘un-
known persons’ labelling the case as homicide, whilst the European
court of Human Rights where the engineer's family had lodged their
appeal, also ruled it as a homicide (see Efsyn, 2018). The CEO of Vo-
dafone Greece, one day after the death of his senior engineer (10/03/
2005), requested and met with the Greek government to inform them of
the illegal software that they discovered. Perhaps coincidentally, the
very same day the only existing legislation that allows for lawful in-
terceptions in Greece was passed (Presidential Decree 47/2005).
The other big scandal, still commonly mentioned in public and
private conversations in Greece, was the Siemens scandal, which ma-
jorly contributed to the deconstruction of the collective public ima-
ginary of Greek progress and modernization in relation to infra-
structure. In 2008, in Munich, the German Department of Justice
revealed that, during the golden period of large public works in Greece,
Siemens had spent 1.3 billion euros to bribe the governing parties and
their officials in order to win the tender process competitions for public
works or have the contracts handed directly to them without any
competition. Siemens, often together with its Greek partner Intracom
(owned by Kokalis), digitalized the telecommunication network in
Fig. 1. The Minister of public works, Laliotis, visiting the Athens metro con-
struction works. 5 March 1998. Image Credits: © ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ/ΜΑΡΟΓΙΑΝΝΗ
ΜΑΡΙΑ.
4 Indeed, the application submitted to the International Olympic Committee
in the bid for Athens' candidacy included two different surveys, made by se-
parate companies, both of which showed that over 90% of Athenians had a
positive attitude toward opinion about hosting the Olympic Games (See
Vernardakis, 2004).
5 Study on volunteerism in Greece (In Greek). See: http://pelopas.uop.gr/
∼volunt/pdfs/volunteer_1.pdf (Accessed 2 April 2017).
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Greece. It also took the contract for the Olympic Games security system
C4I, along with the contract for the third and longest part of the sub-
urban train in Athens, and the contract for the Greek Army tele-
communications system Ermes that was to be upgraded in part due to
Olympic security. The CEO of Siemens Hellas, Christoforakos, escaped
to Germany before his trial in Greece. In 2009 German courts decided
that they could not honour the European warrant that Greece had is-
sued because according to the German legal system Christoforakos
crimes had a statute of limitation. In 2009 he admitted to the attorney
of Munich that he bribed Greek political parties and received a small
sentence. In 2010, the Greek Minister of Transport and
Communications of the ‘Modernizers’ between 1997 and 2000, Tasos
Mantelis, admitted that he received 450,000 German marks worth of
pre-electoral sponsorship in 1998 from SIEMENS. He and a former
SIEMENS executive were eventually convicted of money laundering in
2018 (See Naftemporiki, 2018).
In addition to these scandals one of the most important and wide-
spread conspiracy theories about the Greek debt crisis emerged in 2010
and spread so extensively that it is difficult to find a Greek who has not
heard a version of it. According to this theory, one of the reasons Greece
ended up in the current crisis has to do with South Stream, a large
Gazprom pipeline that was to bring natural gas from the Black Sea
region via Greece to Western Europe with supposedly vast profits for
Greece. Supposedly, Costas Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister from
2004 to 2009, made an agreement with Vladimir Putin for the South
Stream pipeline that would have usurped Nabuco pipeline, the one
being planned by the US to bring natural gas from Asia to Western
Europe via Turkey. The plan never materialized. Articles were pub-
lished (Epikaira, 2011) claiming to have information from a secret re-
port of the Greek intelligence services which indicated that, in 2008, an
assassination attempt was made against the Greek PM. The risk caused
the plans to be put on hold and forced Karamanlis to call emergency
elections. The Greek-American Papandreou won the 2009 elections and
a few months later imposed the loan agreement with the troika (IMF,
EU, ECB) making the country dependent on Europe and the USA (via
IMF) and steering Greece away from Russia.
This story was reproduced widely in the following months via social
media and websites, leading, in 2012, to one of the attorney generals of
Athens to file accusations of high treason against unknown persons who
planned to assassinate the PM (see Reuters, 2012). Eventually, in 2017
the Greek Justice ruled that the allegations about the assassination plan
against the Greek MP were true and ordered the arrest of several people
involved, including US secret agents (To Pontiki, 2017b). In May 2018,
however, new information, which dates back to 2009, surfaced re-
vealing that there never was an actual assassination plan (see Tvxs,
2018). Certainly, this ongoing juridical roller-coaster adds rather than
subtracts to dynamics from this powerful interpretative framework
developed around this infrastructure.
The widespread discursive dynamic of these stories in the public
arena has in effect made possible the re-narration and challenge of the
connection between the infrastructures of the golden era and the ima-
ginaries of progress and national pride. These challenges were soon
extended to include the entire Olympics. Gradually and increasingly
narratives appeared which suggested that the development of the
Olympic infrastructures and the Games were the causes of the 2010
debt crisis. Infrastructures, then, acquire meaning not merely through
everyday ‘conventions of practice’ (Star, 1999, p. 381) and public
contestation, but also, through popular narratives, conspiracy theories
and daily small talk. The interplay between infrastructures and their
materialities on the one hand and morality and discourse on the other,
has already been explored (Humphrey, 2003, 2005). In this framework
the communicative channels created by ‘phatic labor’ (Elyachar, 2010,
p. 459) ‘have allowed for the flow of reputation, information, and
emotion’. That is because phatic forms of labour become formative of
imaginaries around infrastructure by ascribing specific meaning to
these materialities (or immaterialities in cases like South Stream) and
their effects.
However, these narratives not only challenge and cancel the actual
qualities of the material infrastructures along the previous narrative,
but dangerously shake the entire potential future of that infrastructural
model and its socio-material ideology, since they portray under simi-
larly ‘negative’ terms potential infrastructures that lack materiality as
they were never actually built. Thus, the discursive and symbolic dy-
namic which has emerged around infrastructure, and has been
Fig. 2. The signature of Vovos's constructions has been the placing of his name on these buildings. One of these buildings, visible from Kifisias Avenue, co-exists here
with one, out of many, Orthodox churches spread around Athens. Image by authors (2 August 2018).
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spreading widely through phatic labour, not only takes over infra-
structural materiality but, in fact, replaces it.
Contesting infrastructures
A further elaboration of the attempt to build the big waste man-
agement facility in Keratea is useful in order to explore this transition
from an imaginary of progress and modernization to a wider state of
contestation and controversy, but also to help understand the elevation
of various symbolic and discursive dynamics beyond actual infra-
structural materialities. Thus, in Keratea, according to the government
at the time, the project was supposed to be a completely new type of
environmentally-friendly facility for the country's low waste manage-
ment standards, while Greece's supreme court, where the municipality
of Keratea had appealed the government's decision, had ruled that there
were no environmental risks. The site selected, while several miles
away from the town itself, was well within the boundaries of the mu-
nicipality and the people of Keratea and surrounding villages were not
ready to accept the garbage management facility of the 5 million in-
habitants of Athens and its outskirts (perhaps controversially including
their own garbage). As such the conflict was inevitable. On 11
December 2010, the contractor – acting with the explicit support of the
government – began to move their construction machinery onto the
site, while a convoy of riot police accompanied them. The violent
confrontations, which erupted just after and led to a mini war, lasted for
four months. This conflict saw an extended use of police violence, the
first use of a water cannon truck in the country since the early 1980s
and full mobilization of special police forces. The police force was not
limited to guarding the remote area of Ovriokastro—where the landfill
was to be constructed. Rather, they carried out a series of full offensive
manoeuvres against the town itself. The police basically occupied urban
territory from the youth of Keratea who were fighting them street by
street. The Keratea residents and those in solidarity engaged in a mul-
tifarious struggle that varied from road blockades, Molotov cocktails
and sabotage of the contractor's heavy machinery to cultural events on
the highway's main barricade, such as music festivals. Additionally,
collective kitchens and assemblies took place. Participation in these
events was widespread, including school pupils, local middle-class
shopkeepers, residents of neighbouring towns, priests and mayors along
with local and Athenian Leftists and Anarchists.
During those months, Keratea became a site where various different
grassroots political agents met. The conflict also exemplified the wider
legitimacy crisis of the state and official institutions in Greece. In the
course of the conflict, the subtle disparity and unevenness between
local and national ideas, symbols, and discourses in the Greek social
field emerged. In this particular struggle, many people from Keratea put
forward a local rather than a national identification in the context of the
struggle. One of the banners in Keratea read: ‘No to the landfill’; we are
Arvanites',6 referring to the fact that the majority of the original Mes-
sogeia residents belong to the politically well-integrated within the
state apparatus, but linguistically distinct bi-lingual (Albanian and
Greek) speaking minority of Attica. Similar narratives were mentioned
in the assembly or around the main barricade, sometimes as part of a
joke about the alleged stubbornness of Arvanites. Other motifs that
were recorded ethnographically during the winter of 2010–2011 were
the ones that denied the modernization of Messogeia and their in-
tegration into the social Athenian urban fabric, despite the actual ma-
terial integration with the new Attica Ringroad. This is illustrated in
statements such as ‘We are Arvanites and we will take the rifles’ (re-
ferring to the high percentage of hunting rifles that people possess in
the area). In the same context, discourse about the discrimination of the
area and its residents from Athenians who allegedly used to look down
on them as rural (see Madianou, 2014) were often mentioned. More-
over, another repeated oral motif was the discourse against the big
public work contractors mentioned above. More precisely, Bombolas
was mentioned as pushing for the new landfill, as one of his companies,
Helector S.A., is involved in Attica's only landfill in Fylis. Indeed, many
Keratea activists presented their struggle as an anti-systemic struggle
against the corrupt regime of contractors and politicians that have
bankrupted the country. These discourses were so prevalent that He-
lector had to release a public statement clarifying its non-involvement
in the project (To Vima, 2011).
As we already mentioned, Keratea was not just the first major anti-
government struggle against the so-called ‘regimes of the memoranda’ –
named after the memoranda of understanding accompanying the troi-
ka's loan agreements in May 2010 – it was also the first in a series of
major infrastructure related political struggles that ensued in the fol-
lowing years. These political struggles have escalated to unprecedented
levels over the years of the Greek crisis. One of them is the struggle
against the privatization of the water network of Thessaloniki – the
second largest city in the country. This struggle saw actions ranging
from public protests to acts of disobedience by the Water Company
workers who refused to cut houses from the grid if they were not able to
pay their bills. The impasse culminated in the first ever self-organized
referendum in the history of the country. The referendum managed to
appropriate the electoral catalogues from municipal authorities with
more than 218.000 people showing up to vote. The citizens voted
overwhelmingly to halt the privatization plans and for the socialization
of the city's water system.
The struggle of local communities against the gold mines of
Chalkidiki in North Greece is yet another example. Although the re-
sidents of the area have protested against the gold mines since the
1980s, the escalation of 2012 was unprecedented. In early 2012 the
company Hellas Gold was bought by a Canadian company, the Eldorado
Gold Corporation. From the beginning the company clashed with pro-
testing local residents. Similar to the case in Keratea, riot police were
used to protect the private company against the residents' outrage. The
police force and security staff from the company raided the villagers'
watchtower, which had been built to guard the site and from which the
protestors based their operation. Since then, extreme police violence
has escalated with the implementation of anti-terrorist legislation
against protesters and the police force's own terrorist attitude has be-
come an everyday reality. The company also coordinates the miners
and their security staff in carrying out jobs deemed too dirty for the
police force to do themselves. In doing so, they have transformed the
local Skouries forest and the villages of the area, especially Megali
Panayia, into a battlefield (Kadoglou, 2014).
Similar grassroots practices that focus not only on contests, but also,
the wider re-conceptualization of infrastructure have also arisen during
the crisis. One such social movement that blossomed during the crisis is
the so-called ‘I don't pay movement’. This movement began following
the revolt of December 2008 (Vradis & Dalakoglou, 2011) targeting the
rising price of the highway tolls. A process of highway privatization had
begun in 2007 which had led to an enormous increase in both the
number of toll stations and the price of each toll. In the years following
2010, the ‘I don't pay’ campaign spread from a refusal to pay tolls into a
refusal to pay utility bills, mortgages, bus and metro tickets etc. This,
eventually forced the governments of the time to create specific legis-
lation illegalizing the act. In tandem with other pre-existing movements
there was a concerted effort to focus attention on important public
welfare issues, such as the cost of public transportation. They also fa-
cilitated pro-bono DIY re-connection of the houses that had been dis-
connected from electricity or water grids. Moreover, the ‘I don't pay
movement’ expanded its activities during the crisis; it began to organize
gatherings and to intervene to prevent evictions and foreclosures after
they began in 2018.
The profound political elevation of infrastructures' importance
6 It has to be noted that ‘Arvanites of Messogeia have long been “closed”
communities culturally and politically marginalized by central power struc-
tures’ (Gefou-Madianou, 2014: 18).
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during the crisis was also very evident in June 2013 when the Hellenic
Broadcasting Corporation (ERT) was shut down. The closure came out
of the blue, heralded only by an emergency governmental decree that
was applied within a few hours. A black screen replaced the three
publicly funded TV channels and the dozens of national and local radio
stations went silent. The government ordered the eviction of all na-
tional and local public TV and radio stations. All technology associated
with broadcasting was to be shut down. In response, thousands of
employees and activists occupied the facilities all over Greece. In
Athens many local stations and guerrilla broadcasting programs began
to use the internet or alternative airwaves. As the broadcasting infra-
structures were disrupted, media channels and radio stations went off
the air. Eventually, after many months of struggles, police forced the
evacuation of the stations in Athens; however, the facilities of North
Greece and several other smaller cities remained under workers' control
all the way through to 2015 when the new government of the Coalition
of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and ANEL (the Independent Greek party)
announced the re-installation of ERT to serve their own Parties inter-
ests.
Nevertheless, SYRIZA-ANEL coalitions have not escaped from the
‘curse’ of Greek infrastructures during the crisis. Both its two major
infrastructural projects have met with fierce local and national protests.
The first is the extraction of petrol and natural gas in North Western
Greece, which comes with grandiose promises about rescuing the
country from the crisis (Dalakoglou and Bormpoudakis, in press). The
second is the sale of the old Elliniko Airport in order for a completely
new city of 620 ha (including a metropolitan park of more than 200 ha)
to be created on the coast of south Athens (Dalakoglou, 2017b).
‘One eats the other’: Rethinking Athens
Even if some argue that during the Greek crisis many of the afore-
mentioned cases might be seen as controversial there have been, much
more straightforward cases of proposed public work projects which
likewise did not manage to change the negative collective imaginary.
After all, an airport means noise and air pollution, waste management
facilities are considered filthy and polluting. It could even be argued
that the national TV Channel had a controversial role due to its chronic
usage as a propaganda tool by various governments, however, a
beautification and regeneration of the city's centre like the ‘Rethink
Athens’ should had been a much easier case; yet, as it turned out, it was
not.
In 2013 the Greek government announced that Athens city centre
would be part of a high-profile regeneration project. The proposal was
packaged as ‘Rethink Athens’. It included the reconstruction of one of
downtown Athens' main north-south central avenue, Panepistimiou,
and the two most central and emblematic Squares of the city centre:
Syntagma and Omonoia. An international architecture competition
took place during 2012 and the winner – a Dutch urban development
company, Okra – was announced in early 2013. The project, according
to the approved plans, involved the partial pedestrianization of
Panepistimiou Avenue, which would be re-paved, and several new
features such as water fountains and trees would replace the asphalted
avenue. Several other ‘improvements’ were also planned, including the
addition of tramlines. One major aspect of the proposed project was the
activation of a ‘greening strategy for Athens'; the idea here was to create
a ‘resilient, accessible and vibrant city’.7 Shortly thereafter, another
project was attached to Rethink Athens; sponsored by the Onassis
Foundation, the initiative was called ‘Reactivate Athens: 101 Ideas’.
Reactivate claimed to be a project of participatory urban planning
which asked individuals to give ideas to professional urban planners.
Meanwhile, plenty of digital and physical models, plans, and paintings
of the way that the new centre would look were employed. TV Chan-
nels, newspapers and magazines promoted the images, public exhibi-
tions in the otherwise declining centre of Athens were erected and all
the promotional tricks of the golden era were applied (Fig. 3).
The political authorities of the country, including the Prime
Minister at the time, participated in the event launch. The rhetoric
around Rethink echoed the connection between imagination and matter
that we saw in the previous stage of the Modernizers. He stated that
‘along with other interventions, Athens can be reborn again in our
minds, our psyche, and in a few years in reality’ (To Vima, 2013). The
grand narrative was also present. ‘Rethink Athens’ was presented as
part of a larger project including the privatization and regeneration of
the old Athens airport together with the regeneration of the Athenian
seafront from Faliro to Cape Sounio (To Vima, 2013); 72 km south of
Athens city centre. Attempts to appeal to the collective self were made
again, yet, in a less glorified manner, and much more in terms of
emergency in comparison to the Olympic period. According to the
president of Onassis Foundation, which was also involved, ‘saving the
city centre is dependent on the Athenians' patriotism’.8
Despite this, the people most commonly quoted as those supposed to
benefit the most by Rethink Athens, the residents and the shopkeepers
of the so-called ‘commercial triangle’ of Athens9 were not convinced.
This was evident during our ethnography in 2012–2014, precisely the
period that Rethink was most promoted. Most of the residents of the
areas around Panepistimiou and the merchants expressed disbelief and
mistrust towards the new project. And if the area on the eastern part of
Panepistimiou, which is peripheral to Exarcheia is supposedly resided
mostly by people closer to radical political attitudes who would be
suspicious of public space regenerations, the area western of Panepis-
timiou and around Syntagma Square are in their great majority any-
thing but politically radical. Yet the majority of land use on Panepis-
timiou and its arcades is commercial, thus the merchants of
Panepistimiou and Stadiou and Akademias street were the ones most
directly concerned (Fig. 4).
So many business owners there believed that public works from the
golden era, which they then welcomed and supported wholeheartedly,
had eventually proven catastrophic for smaller businesses like theirs.
The case of the repeated reconstructions of Omonoia Square over the
last twenty years is often cited as a project that violently altered the
order of things in the centre of the city. Certainly, Omonoia was quite
an extreme example of creative destruction process, it is impossible
even for merchants who are 40 years on the square to recall how many
times Omonoia has been rebuilt from scratch since the late 1980s.
Moreover, other informants drew ominous comparisons to the pedes-
trianization of Ermou Street, carried out during the second half of the
1990s. Ermou Street runs from Syntagma Square to Monastiraki and has
traditionally been one of the busiest commercial streets in Athens. Its
pedestrianization lasted for some time, and, by the end of it several of
the smaller Ermou shops had closed. This happened partly because the
rents skyrocketed in the reconstructed street but also due to the de-
creased consumption during the period of construction which smaller
merchants could not afford. They were instantly replaced with inter-
national high-street stores. In fact, since the start of the crisis of 2010
there has been an almost complete elimination of independent mer-
chants from Ermou. Meanwhile, during the period of the economic
boom huge shopping malls sprang up in the centre and suburbs of
Athens. These according to Athens' merchants radically altered the
existing balance of the market.
7 Speech by Martin Knuijt in 2013. See: http://www.rethinkathens.org/
uploads/images/okra/Speech-Martin%20Knuijt_OKRA.pdf (Accessed, 10 July
2018).
8 Antonis Papadimitriou, President of the Onassis Foundation, talks to in.gr
(2013). See: http://www.in.gr/2013/02/24/culture/i-diaswsi-toy-kentroy-
epafietai-ston-patriwtismo-twn-athinaiwn/ (Accessed, 9 July 2018).
9 The Athens commercial triangle is located in-between the three main
squares of the Athens' city centre: Omonoia, Syntagma, and Monastiraki.
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Some small independent businesses owners, feeling the pressure of
the economic failure, became verbal about the increasing structural
unfairness of the new conditions implemented in the market since the
construction of the big infrastructures such as the metro, the new air-
port, Attica Expressway and other similar projects in the early 2000s.
Many explicitly blame the authorities that have done their best to pave
the way for larger retail corporations to eliminate small independent
shops. ‘But that's the system, one eats the other10, everyone is against
everyone […] and so that's the system, I have no other name for it’ a
shopkeeper remarked, in a moment of bitter realization.
One of the most common motifs both among business owners,
workers and residents of the area seems to be the so-called ‘interests’
(symferonta/συμφέροντα). Nobody was able to determine them pre-
cisely, but many people active in the centre of the city were angry about
these ‘interests’ which promote the changes. As a term it refers
abstractly to political or economic powers bigger than oneself (often
including international agents) that act in an unethical way and have an
impact on everyday life. In the current case the implication is that there
are such agents who collaborate secretly to ensure the manipulation of
real estate prices in the centre of the city, via the new infrastructural
regeneration presumably, in order to devalue prices to such an extent
that they can eventually buy up huge swathes of property. Though there
were a few companies who acquired a large number of properties in
parts of Athens centre, like Keramikos or Metaxourgeio, prior to the
crisis this activity later stalled and there was a sudden and massive fall
in prices, however, just a few years later it appears the merchants were
accurate in their predictions. Since 2016, with real estate prices deci-
mated, a colossal transfer of ownership has occurred. Today, the
emergence of AirBnB and the exponential increase of property prices
has made next to impossible for Athenians to find affordable property to
rent or buy in Athens' city centre.
In case of the merchants, and other business owners of the area
where Rethink Athens was to be located, although their reactions never
elevated to protest, they were never convinced by the plans to mate-
rially regenerate the centre. It is perhaps no surprise that the plans
Fig. 3. Representation of Omonoia Square as expected that it would look like after the completion of the ‘Rethink Athens’ project. Omonoia Square has been part of
several regeneration projects throughout the years. Image courtesy of OKRA.
Fig. 4. Map of Panepistimiou Street which connects Omonoia Square with Syntagma Square, where Parliament is situated. Source: Image credit: © 2018 Google.
10 ‘One eats the other’ is a direct translation of a Greek phrase that stands for
the English phrase ‘dog eat dog’. For an elaboration of the idea of ‘eating’ in
relation to economic activities and development in the Greek context, see Green
(2008).
D. Dalakoglou, Y. Kallianos Political Geography 67 (2018) 76–87
83
never materialized despite their grand 'inauguration'. Arguably, it may
be claimed that urban planning and economic policies are more com-
plicated than the aforementioned interpretations. Nonetheless the
popular narratives amongst independent merchants and retail em-
ployees during the time when these plans were being promoted so
fervently – similar to the promotion of previous large infrastructural
plans – are telling of the widespread imaginary about infrastructures
and public works in Greece of the crisis.
Conclusion: ‘eating mountains'
If one were to fly towards the new Athens airport they will notice
the huge limestone quarries a few miles before the landing strip (Fig. 5).
This is the Merenda limestone gravel quarry, which was the largest in
Attica. It began to operate in the 1960s, during a previous Greek urban
modernization project, yet its first legal permit was issued in 1980. In
1989, when the whole area of Merenda was declared an archaeological
site, works were supposed to stop, but the quarry continued its opera-
tion based on temporary permits. In 1999 a decision for the restoration
of the site came, but it was in fact cancelled by the Ministry of Public
Works which allowed the continuation of quarrying as part of the need
to complete several major infrastructure projects associated with the
forthcoming Olympic Games (Kathimerini, 2012). As a local fan of
Marko team in Markopoulo town, which has its stadium near the fa-
cilities, suggested during our fieldwork ‘they ate the entire mountain
just before the Olympics.’ The facilities were eventually closed down
long after the Games in 2009.
This controversial open extraction facility is right next to the
Olympic Equestrian Centre of Markopoulo, close to the Attica Ringroad
and the new Airport. The coexistence of all these built symbols of Greek
modernization with the controversial Merenda quarry is one of the best
spatio-temporal encapsulations of unevenness and disparity that have
defined the Greek modernization project.
As has been analysed before (Herzfeld, 1987) and as we showed
above in reference to the Olympic infrastructures, the modern Greek
collective identification processes have been defined by an identity
disemia configured along two contradictive, yet interrelated axes. The
first ‘“Hellenism” tailors a grandiose and de-historicized Classical past’,
and thus an undisputed affirmation of a connection to the West; the
other ‘Romiossini’ expresses an intimate ideological process referring to
unique – often exotic — characteristics (Herzfeld, 1987, p. 65). The
attempt to blend these two opposing frameworks shaped what can be
called a ‘disjunctive modernity’ (Prakash, 2000), a kind of modernity
‘fabricated upon the fissure that appears to separate the Western and
the native, the modern and the traditional’, hence, framing its authority
as ‘perpetually unstable’ (Mitchell, 2000: xxv). Oscillating between two
opposing frameworks of reference, the formations of the collective
Greek identification processes remain ambivalent, open to new con-
figurations that constantly disrupt and (re)negotiate them within the
everyday poetics and politics from below.
If, however, until the early 1990s some of the strongest claims of
modern Greece to Western modernity were mostly based on imaginaries
about the past achievements of Greek Classical antiquity (aided mate-
rially by the ancient monuments [Hamilakis, 2007]), in the 2000s these
claims over Western modernity had also been constituted by material
symbols of technological modernization; from suspension bridges and
mega-events to a brand-new metro, airport, etc. After all, ‘to be modern
is to live within and by means of infrastructures’ (Edwards, 2003, p.
186). Moreover, through an economic and infrastructural expansion to
the Balkans, Greece could at last claim an undisputed inclusion into
European westerness. Generally, during the golden age of infra-
structural development, the ‘experience of infrastructure’ (Dourish &
Bell, 2007, p. 417), the ways in which infrastructure emerged as a
visible component of an ‘increasing dependence upon it for the practice
of everyday life’ was connected to the ideological project of the (re-)
imagination of the modern Greek self. Meanwhile practices that were
labelled as more traditional were affected. For instance, in our case the
mostly agricultural and thus ‘backward’ Messogeia (Madianou, 1999)
Fig. 5. Map indicating the close geographical proximity of the Olympic Equestrian Centre of Markopoulo, the Attica Ringroad and the new Airport with the Merenda
rock quarry. Source: Image credit: © 2018 Google Imagery, © 2018 TerraMetrics.
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became an Athenian suburb, in the entire Attica walkers and public
transport passengers were replaced by drivers, whilst the supposedly
corrupt Greek politicians of the pre-Modernisers' period were replaced
by the supposedly cosmopolitan technocrats who could negotiate suc-
cessfully with Euro-zone officials in Brussels and the International
Olympic Committee.
Although this process was part of an attempt to underplay the ori-
ginal disjunctiveness upon which the modern Greek project was built,
the ‘infrastructuration’ of the latest Greek modernization politics in the
1990s and 2000s, quite literally, cemented this political project of the
Greek modern self-making, thus encapsulating another set of disjunc-
tiveness. The rigid materialization of modernization symbols denied the
necessary space into ‘the work of the imagination’ (Appadurai, 1996)
affecting the multiplicity and creativity at the grassroots level. Crea-
tivity is an essential quality of the imaginary (Castoriadis, 2005; 2001:
66) as it allows agents to ‘see in a thing what it is not’ and ‘to see it other
than it is’ (Castoriadis, 2005, p. 127). Hence, the solidification of the
imaginary through its connection to the new infrastructures took away
the poetics from the politics of this project.
Beyond the specific set of contradictions embedded in the Greek
modernization project since the 1990s, overall, the process of moder-
nization comes with its own set of inherent and ontological disjunc-
tiveness which were also inherited. On the one hand, the taming and
control of ‘nature’ and natural resources by technology - e.g. the
mountain that was transformed into building materials and big modern
infrastructures – is connected to a series of environmental con-
troversies. On the other hand, although the rule of law is allegedly an
important characteristic of the modern polity, the breaking of ethical
laws – ‘eating the mountains’ – and other unethical and/or unlawful
practices, as summarized in the phrase ‘one eats the other’, are inherent
characteristics of the neoliberal modernization process – ‘the utopia of
unlimited exploitation’ (Bourdieu, 1998) that is at play in our case. It is
important to mention that environmental crimes were only one part of
the problem, for example, the building of the Greek Olympic infra-
structures saw a record number of construction workers who were
killed in work related accidents (13 people, in comparison to 1 in the
previous Games of Sydney). The way in which this modernization
process took place challenges a set of ideas related to the ‘modern in-
frastructural ideal’ that is based on ‘rational, comprehensive, planning
driving “progress” towards unitary, coherent and emancipatory cities’
(Graham & Marvin, 2001, p. 41). Seen from this point of view the
construction of the modern collective self is not disconnected from a
wider neoliberalization process that permeates and redefines various
different frameworks at the expense of public interest. Our case of
disjunctive modernization, then, was constituted precisely through the
material codification of everyday contradictions which were facilitated
by this process of modernization.
Nevertheless, this project of modernization was interrupted by the
disinvestment of the European and national infrastructural gap that
appeared in 2007, and especially after the collapse of the global real
estate markets in the crisis of 2008. Following the end of the peak
period in 2005 and especially after the outbreak of the crisis, there was
a disruption of this infrastructural imaginary of progress and develop-
ment. However, given that the new national imaginary of modernized
Greece was so solidly related to and thus depending on the material
infrastructures, the disruption of this imaginary implied, by extension, a
wider crisis of the entire system of reference. The same infrastructures
which were imbued with particular ideas of modernization, the same
government of Modernizers that were gloriously elected before, the
contractors who were promoted as protagonists of modernization, be-
came the very symbols which indicated a fundamental impediment to
this process. In fact, the construction contractors, who today face severe
economic difficulties and legal disputes, were even labelled as ‘pimps’
(davatzides/νταβατζήδες) of the Greek political system in a famous
statement by the PM of 2004–2009 Costas Karamanlis.
If the end of the Olympic Games was the beginning of the end for
this imaginary scheme, the outbreak of the crisis saw its complete
collapse. Infrastructural investments did not only slow down, but also
built infrastructures became the object of a negative collective ima-
ginary associated with scandals and conspiracy theories.
Simultaneously people began to lose access to infrastructure services
and the State authorities lost control over much of this infrastructural
stock as they sold them in order to pay off the debtors and manifest
surplus. That said, questions regarding the abandonment of Olympic
infrastructures appeared literally the day after the Games ended and yet
plenty of them still stand today with very little use. Also, as mentioned
above, highway systems were privatized in 2007, whilst in 2011 the
Touristic and Olympic Real Estate SA companies that were founded
during the late 1990s and early 2000s were merged together with other
companies that administrated Greek public assets in the Public
Properties Company SA. This company, which does not belong to the
Greek Public Sector, now manages and occasionally sells some of the
country's most expensive real estate and public assets. Indeed, these
companies were initially founded during the golden period, as private
companies – a new technocratic way of public administration – to take
control of these assets, fundamentally bypassing basic legal frameworks
which considered such assets as the common property of the Greek
State or the Greek people and as such impossible to privatize (e.g.
seafront, islands etc.) Within the then climate of optimism such in-
cidents together with the eating of mountains, the deaths of construc-
tion workers, etc. were ignored.
Today, the infrastructural imaginary is connected with a general
socio-political unease, and the experience of the (non-)existent infra-
structure is shaped by an imagination that once again unsettles the
position of Greece within the Western Modern endeavour. Moreover,
imagination has now become formative of the very experience of in-
frastructures, therefore, ‘overtaking’ their material features. As the
cases concerning the various conspiracy theories and scandals as well as
the non-materialization of infrastructures (e.g. South Stream or Rethink
Athens, Keratea waste management facilities) show, this infrastructural
imaginary transformation is so widespread and dynamic that it upsets
previously established ideas about progress and what it means to be
modern today, thus forming an imagination about the politics of in-
frastructure that goes beyond its actual matter. While, the non-com-
pletion of some of these projects could be ascribed to the lack of funds,
the widespread instances of contest point to the various ways in which
existing infrastructure projects and the promise of new infrastructures
have been confronted with doubt and mistrust on the one hand, and
social conflict and contestation on the other.
The cases described here, also demonstrate that this transition from
one context and level to the next is defined by a ‘phatic labor’ (Elyachar,
2010) that grows around and through infrastructure to provide specific
interpretations of events that seem to have wider effects across civil
society. Following Elyachar's (2010: 453) idea that phatic labour ‘pro-
duces communicative channels that can potentially transmit not only
language but also all kinds of semiotic meaning and economic value’,
we understand the everyday practices, narratives, and symbolisms that
have emerged around infrastructures to mobilize and perform emo-
tions, expectations and imaginations which reflect ways that people
make sense of their position in the social field. In this particular ima-
ginary, wider geopolitical processes reshape the everyday experience
and view of infrastructures, since imagination about how global poli-
tical processes take place intertwine with local processes and percep-
tions of governance. Infrastructural imaginaries, then, form a con-
nective link between micro and macro socio-political dynamics. They
force us to stay attentive to the variegated ways in which infrastructure
is produced and (re)negotiated in the everyday and to the fact that
infrastructures ‘operate on multiple levels concurrently’ (Larkin, 2013,
p. 335).
Though diverse, and over two distinct periods in infrastructural
history of Greece, the cases examined in this paper, share a common
imbuement of infrastructure processes with imaginary potential to
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organize meaning around everyday experiences. In light of this, the
social performance of ‘disjunctiveness’, as is conveyed through popular
discourses, reflects imaginations concerning notions of citizenship,
political participation, and the state and unveils ways in which these
are negotiated, experienced, moralized and normalized – or not. Such
rhetorical schemes, which point out critical fissures and contradictions,
act as powerful urban and infrastructural pedagogies, not necessarily of
either trust or distrust of the ‘system’, but in ascribing meaning to and
performing, in other respects, elusive and ‘abstract’ top-down processes
of ‘how things work’, which, here, should not be considered just an
empty rhetoric devoid of hope, but rather, a tool of positioning in the
social field.
Imagination, then, in the context of its relation to infrastructure, can
be a tool of consent as well as a device of delegitimation and con-
testation. By employing infrastructure as an ethnographic category,
what we have attempted to do is to elaborate on this dual function of
infrastructural imagination by scrutinizing the way in which imagin-
aries created around socio-technical systems have been formative of
civic matters. In addition, the notion of ‘disjunctive modernity’ has been
helpful to us in demonstrating the various forces at play in relation to
how infrastructures embody opposing dynamics which, in turn, pro-
duce various contradictions in the everyday. These processes also point
out the ways in which infrastructures have been ‘activated’ in times of
crisis. Functioning as artefacts through which the ‘elusiveness’ of the
various dynamics that constitute the crisis can be experienced and
imagined, infrastructures have become ‘matters’ of the crisis itself.
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